The last months of Sadat’s presidency were marked by internal uprising. He dismissed allegations that the rioting was incited by domestic issues, believing that the Soviet Union was recruiting its regional allies in Libya and Syria to incite an uprising that would eventually force him out of power.
Following a failed military coup in June 1981, Sadat ordered a major crackdown that resulted in the arrest of numerous opposition figures, particularly those on the left. This further increased his unpopularity.
Earlier in Sadat’s presidency, Islamists had benefited from the “rectification revolution” and the release from prison of activists jailed under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the former socialist president of Egypt.
Sadat’s Sinai treaty with Israel at Camp David enraged Islamists, particularly the radical Egyptian Islamic Jihad. According to interviews and information gathered by journalist Lawrence Wright, the group was recruiting military officers and accumulating weapons, waiting for the right moment to launch “a complete overthrow of the existing order” in Egypt.
Chief strategist of El-Jihad was Abbud al-Zumar, a colonel in the military intelligence whose plan was to kill the main leaders of the country, capture the headquarters of the army and State Security, the telephone exchange building, and of course the radio and television building, where news of the Islamic revolution would then be broadcast, unleashing—he expected—a popular uprising against secular authority all over the country.
The last months of Sadat’s presidency were marked by internal uprising. He dismissed allegations that the rioting was incited by domestic issues, believing that the Soviet Union was recruiting its regional allies in Libya and Syria to incite an uprising that would eventually force him out of power.
Following a failed military coup in June 1981, Sadat ordered a major crackdown that resulted in the arrest of numerous opposition figures, particularly those on the left. This further increased his unpopularity.
Earlier in Sadat’s presidency, Islamists had benefited from the “rectification revolution” and the release from prison of activists jailed under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the former socialist president of Egypt.
Sadat’s Sinai treaty with Israel at Camp David enraged Islamists, particularly the radical Egyptian Islamic Jihad. According to interviews and information gathered by journalist Lawrence Wright, the group was recruiting military officers and accumulating weapons, waiting for the right moment to launch “a complete overthrow of the existing order” in Egypt.
Chief strategist of El-Jihad was Abbud al-Zumar, a colonel in the military intelligence whose plan was to kill the main leaders of the country, capture the headquarters of the army and State Security, the telephone exchange building, and of course the radio and television building, where news of the Islamic revolution would then be broadcast, unleashing—he expected—a popular uprising against secular authority all over the country.
These guys always have such high hopes. But it never works out that way. 90% of the work has to be done before anyone declares a revolt.