There was the semi-recent report following the plane disappearance in the Carolinas that pointed to the battle readiness of the F35 program being lower than is acceptable (don’t remember the percentage thrown out there), and a lot of that is due to the corporate side of the deal. Parts are not readily available when needed, repairs are going slower than we are used to, and this is on top of using newer technologies in an effort to PREDICT future conflicts.
I hope we have learned our lessons from the F22 and F35 programs. New tank designs for the successor to the M1A2 Abrams are popping up. We cannot allow future programs to continue to favor corporate profits to these levels.
Also, a big contributor to the expense of the F-22, both as a program and on a per unit basis, is that the US didn’t make the aircraft available for purchase by foreign allies. So there’s only, iirc, 200-some-odd F-22s in existence.
That means far fewer produced, and by extension, more of the one-time costs are baked into each fighter, and upgrades, maintenance, and “future proofing” expenses are spent in support of a smaller overall fleet, which lowers the ceiling on profitability and limits the benefits of scaling.
All that, and it’s still the best air-to-air platform in existence, and the US is the only country that has em.
One of the biggest budget issues with the F35 program is that maintenance and repairs must go through private industry. Corporations just continuing to milk profit at every level. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/09/22/gao-blasts-contractor-led-f-35-maintenance-as-costly-slow/
There was the semi-recent report following the plane disappearance in the Carolinas that pointed to the battle readiness of the F35 program being lower than is acceptable (don’t remember the percentage thrown out there), and a lot of that is due to the corporate side of the deal. Parts are not readily available when needed, repairs are going slower than we are used to, and this is on top of using newer technologies in an effort to PREDICT future conflicts.
I hope we have learned our lessons from the F22 and F35 programs. New tank designs for the successor to the M1A2 Abrams are popping up. We cannot allow future programs to continue to favor corporate profits to these levels.
Thank you for the link and info!
Also, a big contributor to the expense of the F-22, both as a program and on a per unit basis, is that the US didn’t make the aircraft available for purchase by foreign allies. So there’s only, iirc, 200-some-odd F-22s in existence.
That means far fewer produced, and by extension, more of the one-time costs are baked into each fighter, and upgrades, maintenance, and “future proofing” expenses are spent in support of a smaller overall fleet, which lowers the ceiling on profitability and limits the benefits of scaling.
All that, and it’s still the best air-to-air platform in existence, and the US is the only country that has em.
Thanks for the explaination!