So he can bur… Ah.

The problem is that this strategy is becoming more popular in physical product development, for things that we’ve known how to make for decades.

You don’t need to move fast and break things when you’re making a car. We’ve been making cars on assembly lines for a hundred years, innovation is going to be small.

Same thing for rockets. We put men on the moon 50 years ago for fucks sake. Rocketry is a well understood engineering field at this point. We know exactly how much force needs to exerted, we know exactly the stresses involved. You don’t need to rapidly iterate anything. Sit down, do the math, build the thing to spec, and it fucking works: see ULA, ESA, and NASA who have, all in the past few years, built rockets and had them successfully complete missions on the first launch without blowing up a bunch to “gather data”

Move fast and break things is for companies that have crackhead leadership who can’t make up their mind about what a product should do. It should have no place in real world engineering, where you know what your product is going to be subject to.

“Looks at SpaceX”, Iterate quickly and break things can work for rockets, it just depends on the development phase and the type of project. I wouldn’t “iterate quickly” with manned, extra terrestrial or important cargo missions.

But it can be used for the early development of rockets. Space X had a deep well of proven technology to draw upon during the development of the Falcon rocket. They put the tech together and iterated quickly to get a final product.

Blue Origin as well as the Artemis program both use traditional techniques with similar proven technologies. I’d argue they aren’t as successful or were never intended to be successful (Artemis is just a jobs program for shuttle contractors at this point).

I understand what you’re saying about failing early. That’s a great strategy but it’s meant to apply to production software. As in, your product shouldn’t even start up if critical parts are missing or misconfigured. The software should be capable of testing its configuration and failing when anything is wrong, before it breaks anything else. During the development process, failing early also speeds up iteration cycles, but again, that’s only when it’s built into the sw runtime that it carries with it.

“Fail early” can also mean your product stops working and shuts down as soon as its environment changes in a disruptive way; for example, if you’re using a database connection, and the database goes down, and you can’t recover or reconnect, you shut down. Or you go into read-only mode until your retries finally succeed. That’s a form of “fail early” where “early” means “as soon as possible after a problem arises”.

You don’t want your development processes to move fast and break things. If your dev and staging environments are constantly broken because you moved fast and broke things, you will ship broken software. The more bugs there are in there due to your development practices, the more bugs you’ll ship, in a linear relationship.

QA and controlled development iterations with good quality practices and good understanding by all team members is how you prevent these problems. You avoid shipping bugs by detecting failures early, not by making mistakes early.

Not sure why you’re being aggro. I asked if this is part of their corporate identity. Zuckerberg went around literally advocating for that approach. Plenty of other companies are shitty without explicitly calling for that specific philosophy.

I think you mean without rollout phases.

I would assume he means speed in regards to catching malicious software and not speed of development, do you have a reason to think otherwise?

It’s no tits.

The update that broke everything only pushed data, not code. The bug was extant in the software before the update, likely for years.

A terrifyingly large number of critical issues come to light like this. The code has been broken since the first release, but nobody noticed until a certain edge-case occurs.

Even if a fix was discovered quickly it wouldn’t prevent the problem that it must be manually fixed on each computer. In this case a fix was discovered quickly even without access to source code.

Just having more eyes on the source code won’t do much. To discover errors like these the program must be properly tested on actual devices. This part obviously went wrong on Crowdstrike’s side. Making the code open source won’t necessarily fix this. People aren’t going to voluntarily try every cutting edge patch on their devices before it goes live.

I also doubt any of the forks would get much traction. IT departments aren’t going to jump to the next random fork, especially when the code has kernel access. If we can’t trust Crowdstrike, how can we trust new randos?

I wouldn’t call it a bug.

Any software running in kernel mode needs to be designed very carefully, because any error will crash the entire system.

The software is risky because it needs to run in kernel mode to monitor the entire system, but it also needs to run unsigned code to be up to date with new threats as they are discovered.

The software should have been designed to verify that the files are valid, before running them. Whatever sanity checks they might have done on the files, it clearly wasn’t thorough enough.

From my reading, this wasn’t an unforeseeable bug, but a known risk that was not properly designed around.

Bet they use it to spy on workers looking for “slacker behavior”.

Well it isn’t actually a confirmed case. Ruiu, the original person reporting the issue wasn’t sure exactly what the surface area of attack was at the start. Ruiu Dragos, who is a security researcher believed it infected via speakers.

Eventually Errata CEO, Robert Graham, said that if he spent a year, he could build malware that did the same and that it was ‘really, really easy’

Eventually, Ruiu noticed that the initial stage of infection was from one of his USB sticks.

The speakers part comes in that he found that the packets transmitted between badBIOS infected machines stopped if he disconnected the internal speaker and microphone.

Meaning, that sure, badBIOS may communicate data with each other via speakers but that it has never been proven that it could actually infect another machine via speakers. However, that hasn’t stopped articles from conflating things.

Article doesn’t explain how it even coupd spread at all.