Fifteen months ago, Vladimir Putin’s army was on the outskirts of Kyiv. Now the Russian leader is struggling to maintain control in Moscow. The rebellion of Wagner forces, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, is the final confirmation of how catastrophically wrong the war in Ukraine has gone for Putin. Even if the Russian leader prevails in the immediate battle against Wagner, it is hard to believe that Putin can ultimately survive this kind of humiliation. His prestige, his power, even his life, are now on the line.

The historic irony is that Putin’s own actions have brought about the thing he fears most: an insurrection that threatens both the Russian state and his own personal power. Putin’s fear of a “colour revolution” in Russia dates back almost 20 years. Fittingly, its origins lie in Ukraine. The Orange revolution of 2004 — a popular, democratic uprising against a rigged election in Ukraine — sparked a paranoia in the Russian president that has steadily intensified over the years.

Ever since, Putin has been haunted by two linked fears. First, that Ukraine would slip irrevocably from Russia’s grasp. Second, that a successful pro-democracy uprising in Kyiv would be a dry run for the same thing in Moscow.

His decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 was an effort to finally snuff out both dangers — by installing a pro-Russian, authoritarian government in Kyiv.

As a former intelligence operative and conspiracy theorist, Putin was convinced that the origins of any “colour revolution” — whether in Ukraine or Russia — would lie in Washington. His refusal to believe that Ukrainians might have agency or power led to his fatal underestimation of the strength of the country’s resistance to a Russian invasion.

As well as underestimating Ukrainian strength, Putin — drunk on the mythology of the Red Army of the 1940s — fatally overestimated Russia’s own military power. The failure of the Russian army opened the door for the Wagner group to enter the war. This gave Prigozhin his own power base and propaganda platform and ultimately allowed him to turn on the Russian state.

Putin’s pitch to the Russian people has always been that he rescued the country from the anarchy of the 1990s. But what is happening now is reminiscent of the failed military and hardliner coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin mounted a tank outside parliament. At that point, the people of Moscow played a vital role in the unfolding events. The reaction of the Russian population to the Prigozhin uprising will be a crucial — and, as yet, unknown — part of this story.

In his own first remarks on the Prigozhin uprising, Putin looked back to an even darker precedent: the alleged “stab in the back” that ended the Russian war effort in 1917 and pitched the country into revolution and civil war. These words were meant to convey firmness of purpose. But they were hardly reassuring.

The Wagner insurrection will give hope to opponents of the Putin regime — both inside and outside Russia. For the Ukrainian military, whose counter-offensive has failed to break through, this looks like a historic opportunity. If Russia’s forces turn on each other, or are pulled back from the frontline to defend Putin, they could fold in eastern Ukraine.

Political prisoners in Russia, such as Alexei Navalny or Vladimir Kara-Murza, must also have a new sense of hope and opportunity. They, too, may play a part over the coming months. Prigozhin, of course, is no liberal. His rhetoric is stridently nationalist and imperialist. The Wagner forces have a well-earned reputation for brutality. But Prigozhin — like Putin — has now unleashed forces that he will struggle to control.

gideon.rachman@ft.com

  • Daniel Jackson@lemmy.world
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    1 year ago

    Do you read your own links? Literally the first line is

    Russian interference in the 2016 Brexit referendum is a debated subject and remains unproven

    Yes I do. You literally removed the next part of the sentence:

    Russian interference in the 2016 Brexit referendum is a debated subject and remains unproven, though multiple sources argue evidence exists demonstrating that the Russian government attempted to influence British public opinion in favour of leaving the European Union.
    […]
    Data released by Twitter in 2018 identified 3,841 accounts of Russian origin affiliated with the Internet Research Agency, […] which collectively sent over 10 million Tweets in “an effort to spread disinformation and discord” […] with a “day-long blitz” on the day of the referendum
    […]
    British Journalist Isabel Oakeshott stated in an article for the Times: "As part of my research I uncovered controversial information about links between Arron Banks and his associate Andy Wigmore and the Russian embassy in London. […] Arron Banks was the largest donor to the Brexit campaign. Prior to the donations, Southern Rock, Banks’ underwriting company was technically insolvent and needed to find £60m to meet regulations. It was saved by a £77m cash injection, […] from another company, ICS Risk Solutions. […] Around the same time, September 2015, Banks, along with Andy Wigmore, started having multiple meetings with Russian officials posted at the Russian embassy in London

    https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2022/eu-states-exported-weapons-to-russia/

    Regarding the french weapons. I’m not an expert on the subject. It sounds like old deals which were paid at time of delivery. Cancelling these deals right at delivery, after the weapons were manufactured, would have meant telling private companies that they can’t recover costs for items already manufactured. These defense contractors would have sued the hell out of the state.

    Also, this article focuses on EU countries at the time of the invasion. The UK was excluded, since it wasn’t part of the EU.

    The UK was by far the biggest weapon exporter to Russia before the invasion of Ukraine

    They literally said there’s no risk less than 4 months prior to Russia’s invasion

    The German government on Thursday declassified a top-secret security assessment on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from 2021, only four months before the outbreak of war, which claimed energy supplies “won’t be jeopardized” by increased dependency on Russian gas.

    Can we stop talking about Nord Stream 2? I don’t understand the fixation on Nord Stream 2. The thing was already controversial in Germany before it was even supposed to be turned on. There were pushbacks from the general population way before the invasion of Ukraine. And at the end it never got turned on! Who cares?

    The controversial opinion displays an exceedingly naive view of the risks posed by Germany’s significant reliance on Russian gas deliveries, which had continuously grown in the years prior to Moscow’s war. It also rejects concerns by Eastern European partners like Poland and Ukraine, which had long warned the Nord Stream 2 undersea pipeline designed to carry natural gas directly from Russia to northern Germany would increase the risk of energy blackmail by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

    First of all, Poland was also depending on Russian gas, so it was a little hypocrytical from them to call for Germany to stop the dependence.

    Also, up to the begining to the war, Ukraine was still indirectly importing Russian gas, so it’s the pot calling the kettle black IMHO.

    Energy is a very difficult topic. Where should have Germany got their supply? It’s easy to criticize with 20/20 hindsight. But given the context at the time, it was not the best decision ever, but it was as insane as people make it sound like today.